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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JS

JCSM-91-68

11 FEB 1968

12 - 16B - 68

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Emergency Reinforcement of COMUSMACV ~~601~~

1. ~~(S)~~ Reference is made to your oral request of 9 February 1968 for three plans which would provide emergency reinforcement of COMUSMACV.

2. ~~(T)~~ The three plans examined are:

a. Plan One, which is based upon prompt deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division and 6/9 Marine division/wing team, callup of some 120,000 Army and Marine Corps Reserves, and appropriate legislative action to permit extension of terms of service of active duty personnel and the recall of individual Reservists.

b. Plan Two, which would deploy as many Marine Corps battalions as are now available in CONUS, less one battalion in the Caribbean, the battalion in the Mediterranean, and the Guantanamo Defense Force. This plan would not be based upon a callup of Reservists or legislative action.

c. Plan Three, which would deploy the 82nd Airborne Division but would leave Marine Corps battalions in CONUS. This plan would likewise envisage no Reserve callup and no legislative action.

The guidelines for development of the plans and description of the airlift force mix options and movement capability are contained in Annex A. Plan One is examined in detail in Annex B, Plan Two in Annex C, and Plan Three in Annex D. Plans One and Three would require appropriate tactical air units for support of Army forces. All three plans require other support forces consistent with the duration of the augmentation.

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3. ~~SECRET~~ Assessment of the Situation in Vietnam.

- a. The VC/NVA forces have launched large-scale offensive operations throughout South Vietnam.
- b. As of 11 February 1968, Headquarters, MACV, reports that attacks have taken place on 34 provincial towns, 64 district towns, and all of the autonomous cities.
- c. The enemy has expressed his intention to continue offensive operations and to destroy the Government of Vietnam and its Armed Forces.
- d. The first phase of his offensive has failed in that he does not have adequate control over any population center to install his Revolutionary Committees which he hoped to form into a coalition with the NLF.
- e. He has lost between 30 and 40 thousand killed and captured, and we have seized over seven thousand weapons.
- f. Reports indicate that he has committed the bulk of his VC main force and local force elements down to platoon level throughout the country, with the exception of six to eight battalions in the general area of Saigon.
- g. Thus far, he has committed only 20 to 25 percent of his North Vietnamese forces. These were employed as gap fillers where VC strength was apparently not adequate to carry out his initial thrust on the cities and towns. Since November, he has increased his NVA battalions by about 25. The bulk of these and the bulk of the uncommitted NVA forces are in the I Corps area.
- h. It is not clear whether the enemy will be able to recycle his attacks in a second phase. He has indicated his intention to do so during the period from 10 to 15 February.
- i. South Vietnamese forces have suffered nearly two thousand killed, over seven thousand wounded, and an unknown number of absences. MACV suspects the desertion rate may be high. The average present for duty strength of RVN infantry battalions is 50 percent and Ranger Battalions, 43 percent. Five of nine airborne battalions are judged by MACV to be combat ineffective at this time.

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4. (S) MACV, RVNAF posture - COMUSMACV has expressed three major concerns:

- a. The ability of the weakened RVNAF to cope with additional sustained enemy offensive operations.
- b. Logistic support north of Danang, because of weather and sea conditions in the Northern I Corps area, enemy interdiction of Route 1, and the probability of intensified combat in that area.
- c. The forces available to him are not adequate at the moment to permit him to pursue his own campaign plans and to resume offensive operations against a weakened enemy, considering the competing requirements of reacting to enemy initiatives, assisting in defending Government centers, and reinforcing weakened RVNAF units when necessary.

5. (S) It is not clear at this time whether the enemy will be able to mount and sustain a second series of major attacks throughout the country. It is equally unclear as to how well the Vietnamese Armed Forces would be able to stand up against such a series of attacks if they were to occur. In the face of these uncertainties, a more precise assessment of USMACV's additional force requirements, if any, must await further developments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not exclude the possibility that additional developments could make further deployments necessary.

6. (S) Measured against the foregoing, the only active combat-ready and readily deployable general purpose forces consist of the 82nd Airborne Division, one and one-third Marine division/wing teams, eight recalled Air National Guard tactical fighter squadrons, and nonforward-deployed Navy forces which constitute the rotation base for forward deployments. Thus, the residual CONUS-based active combat-ready ground forces that would result from the execution of each of the plans examined would be:

- a. Plan One - 6/9 Marine Division/Wing Team.
- b. Plan Two - One Airborne Division.
- c. Plan Three - One and 3/9 Marine Division/Wing Team.

These Army and Marine Corps forces are at various levels of readiness, and a high percentage of personnel assigned are Vietnam returnees or personnel close to end of obligated active service.

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7. (S) An examination was made to determine the feasibility of a more rapid acceleration in the deployment of the four infantry battalions now scheduled to deploy to Southeast Asia in March-April as a part of Program 5 forces. It was concluded that, while these units are currently undergoing an accelerated training program, they have not yet completed company-level training and should not be deployed earlier, except under the most critical circumstances.

8. (S) In addition to examining the criticality of deployments to South Vietnam, we must look to our capacity to meet the possibility of widespread civil disorder in the United States in the months ahead. It appears that, whether or not deployments under any of these plans are directed, sufficient forces are still available for civil disorder control. These include National Guard forces deployed under State or Federal control, composite units brought together in each CONUS Army area, and some of the troops from the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions and 5th Infantry Division (Mech).

9. (TS) Against the possible increase in force requirements in Southeast Asia as well as those to respond to contingencies elsewhere in the world, our posture of readily available combat forces is seriously strained. Consequently, any decision to deploy emergency augmentation Active forces should be accompanied by the recall of at least an equivalent number from the Reserve components and an extension of terms of service for active duty personnel. In view of the time required to bring Reserve component forces to a combat-ready status - two months for the 4th Marine Division/Wing Team and three or more months for Army Reserve component divisions - and the limited number of Active combat forces available for deployment, it would be prudent to call to active duty certain additional Reserve component forces.

10. (S) While there are variations in the problems of each of the Services, the rotation/training base of each is stretched and would be incapable of supporting, under existing criteria, substantially increased unit deployments. In addition, the capability of our uncommitted general purpose forces is further constrained by shortages of critical skilled specialists and shortages in mission-essential items of materiel and equipment, such as munitions, modern combat aircraft, helicopters, and communications/electronics and heavy engineer equipment.

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11. (b) Based on the foregoing assessment of the situation and problems facing COMUSMACV and the analysis of courses of action contained in the Annexes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude and recommend that:

- a. A decision to deploy reinforcements to Vietnam be deferred at this time.
- b. Measures be taken now to prepare the 82nd Airborne Division and 6/9 Marine division/wing team for possible deployment to Vietnam.
- c. As a matter of prudence, call certain additional Reserve units to active duty now. Deployment of emergency reinforcements to Vietnam should not be made without concomitant callup of Reserves sufficient at least to replace those deployed and provide for the increased sustaining base requirements of all Services. In addition, bring selected Reserve force units to full strength and an increased state of combat readiness.
- d. Legislation be sought now to (1) provide authority to call individual Reservists to active duty; (2) extend past 30 June 1968 the existing authority to call Reserve units to active duty; and (3) extend terms of service for active duty personnel.
- e. Procurement and other supply actions be taken now to overcome shortages existing in certain critical items of materiel and equipment such as munitions, helicopters, and other combat aircraft.

12. (b) The Joint Chiefs of Staff observe that many additional problems pertaining to US military capabilities - although critical - are not treated in this paper. An updated assessment of US military posture worldwide and specific recommendations for required improvements will be reported to you in the near future.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

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ANNEX A

PLAN GUIDELINES, AIRLIFT OPTIONS, AND
MOVEMENT CAPABILITY

1. ~~(S)~~ Guidelines for development of all three plans are: 1
a. The 82nd Airborne Division and Marine forces would be 2
deployed by units, rather than drawing personnel from those 3
units for individual personnel replacements. 4
b. Zero warning time is assumed, and deployments would com- 5
mence as soon as possible after decision is made (date of deci- 6
sion is hereinafter referred to as X-day). 7
c. Personnel are considered eligible for deployment if they 8
have more than 30 days remaining before expiration of term of 9
service (ETS). 10
d. The personnel rotation policy is considered waived, and 11
individuals would thereby be returned without regard to prior 12
duty in short-tour areas. 13
e. Current tour lengths in Southeast Asia remain unchanged, 14
except for minor adjustments due to use of replacement pipeline 15
personnel. 16
f. All plans are to give consideration to dealing with 17
widespread civil disorders in the United States. 18
g. Logistic aspects of the various courses of action are to 19
be considered. 20
h. Our posture in Northeast Asia will be maintained. 21
2. ~~(S)~~ A number of airlift force mix options were considered, 22
but, by process of elimination, the choices were narrowed to seven. 23
Each of the options listed below does not use capability of 24
assorted aircraft which are the JCS-assured levels for other world- 25
wide priorities. The characteristics of these mixes are: 26
27
a. Option I 28
(1) Maintains Southeast Asia airlift at current level. 28
(2) Utilizes: MAC at peacetime rate 29
Current voluntary ANG and AFR 30
Voluntary commercial contract 31

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b. <u>Option II</u>	1
(1) Maintains Southeast Asia airlift at current level.	2
(2) Utilizes:	
TAC at wartime rate	3
MAC at wartime rate	4
Current voluntary ANG and AFR	5
Voluntary commercial contract	6
c. <u>Option III</u>	7
(1) Maintains Southeast Asia airlift at current level.	8
(2) Utilizes:	
TAC at wartime rate	9
MAC at wartime rate	10
Activate remainder of ANG and AFR ^{1/}	11
Voluntary commercial contract	12
d. <u>Option IV</u>	13
(1) Maintains Southeast Asia airlift of current level.	14
(2) Utilizes:	
TAC at wartime rate	15
MAC at wartime rate	16
Activate remainder of ANG and AFR ^{1/}	17
Activate CRAF I	18
e. <u>Option V</u>	19
(1) Drawdown Southeast Asia airlift 35 percent below	20
current levels.	21
(2) Utilizes:	
TAC at wartime rate	22
MAC at wartime rate	23
Activate remainder of ANG and AFR ^{1/}	24
Activate CRAF I	25
f. <u>Option VI</u>	26
(1) Drawdown Southeast Asia airlift 70 percent below	27
current levels.	28
(2) Utilizes:	
TAC at wartime rate	29
MAC at wartime rate	30
Activate remainder of ANG and AFR ^{1/}	31
Activate CRAF I	32
g. <u>Option VII</u>	33
(1) Maintains Southeast Asia airlift at current level.	34
(2) Utilizes:	
TAC at wartime rate	35
MAC at wartime rate	36
Activate remainder of ANG and AFR ^{1/}	37
Activate CRAF III	38

1/ Four-engine transports only.

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3. (TS) The closure times in days after execution order for
the three plans and seven airlift force mix options are:

<u>Airlift</u>	<u>Plan One</u>	<u>Plan Two</u>	<u>Plan Three</u>	
Option I	59	31	34	4
Option II	33	22	16	5
Option III	30	21	15	6
Option IV	22	15	12	7
Option V	19	12	12	8
Option VI	19	12	12	9
Option VII	19	11	12	0

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ANNEX B

PLAN ONE

Deployment of the 82d Airborne Division and 6/9ths of a Marine Corps Division/Wing-Team to South Vietnam.	1 2
a. <u>82d Airborne Division</u>	3
(1) <u>Deployment concept.</u> Without prior notice, elements of one brigade can commence movement in 24 hours; the division itself 36-48 hours later. Deploy- ment would be conducted in four echelons: two brigade task forces followed by the division support element, then a brigade task force. The deployments can be continuous if aircraft are available.	4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(2) Major forces to be deployed from CONUS within one week:	11 12
82d Airborne Division Headquarters	13
Division Support Command	14
Three Airborne Brigades	15
Three Airborne Battalions each	16
Division Artillery	17
Three Field Artillery Battalions (105 mm)	18
One Cavalry Squadron	19
Total Deployment Strength	13,038
(3) <u>Transportation Requirements.</u> The transporta- tion requirements for the move of the 82d Airborne Division from Fort Bragg (and staging areas) are as follows:	21 22 23 24
Personnel (Authorized strength)	13,038
Short tons of cargo	11,585

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For movement options, see TAB A. 1

(4) Deployment Criteria and Current Major Shortages: 2

(a) Personnel. Division is currently short 3,074
personnel but can be filled with non-airborne personnel
in 7-10 days using 30 days expiration of term of
service (ETS) retainability criteria. 4
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(b) Aviators. Division currently has shortage of
133 officer/warrant officer aviators, but these can
be provided within 7-10 days after decision by using
30-days ETS retainability criteria. Replacing aviator
shortages will cause severe personal hardship and
curtail the provision of aviators to Korea. 7
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(c) Aircraft. Current status: 13

	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On-Hand</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>	
UH-1B/C	14	1	13*	14 15
UH-1D/H	35	12	23*	16
OH-13, OH-23, OH-6	48	0	48**	17 18 19

For further discussion, see TAB B, Logistics Considerations. 20

b. 6/9ths of a Marine Corps Division/Wing Team. 21

(1) Deployment Concept. 6/9ths of a Marine Corps
division/wing team could be ready for deployment by air
from the East and West Coasts of the United States
to Vietnam in one week without utilizing Vietnam replace-
ment drafts. If movement can be started two weeks after
decision, and pipeline personnel are used, units will
be drawn only from the West Coast, with East Coast
assets retained in place. Combat elements on both coasts
will be available for airlift commencing 24 hours after
notification. 22
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* 36 aircraft to be provided from STRAF within 7 days which has
103 of 811 UH-1s authorized. Deployability criteria may have
to be waived for some aircraft.

** All OH-23s can be furnished in seven days from CONUS assets if
deployability criteria is waived.

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(2) Major Marine Corps forces to be deployed from CONUS, without utilizing Vietnam replacement draft personnel, within one week:

(a) West Coast

Marine Division Headquarters	5
One Regimental Landing Team	6
Three Battalion Landing Teams*	7
One Direct Support Artillery Battalion	8
One F-8 Squadron (Hawaii)	9
One F-4 Squadron (Japan-Program 5)	10
One A-4 Squadron (Japan-Program 5)	11

(b) East Coast

One Regimental Landing Team	13
Three Battalion Landing Teams	14
One Direct Support Artillery Battalion	15
One Provisional Marine Air Group	16
Two F-4 Squadrons	17
Two A-4 Squadrons	18
One UH-1E Squadron	19
Total Deployment Strength	14,960

(3) Transportation requirements will be as follows:

<u>Hawaii</u>	<u>Without Pipeline</u>		<u>With Pipeline</u>		22
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>	
F-8 Sqdn BLT*	231 1575	388 1494	231 1575	388 1494	24 25
<u>West Coast</u>					26
Div Hq and RLT (-)	5161	3317			27 28
Div Hq, RLT, RLT (-)			10575	7865	29 30
<u>East Coast</u>					31
Prov MAG RLT	2579 5414	6790 4531	2579	6790	32 33
TOTAL:	14960	16540	14960	16540	34

* One BLT based in Hawaii commenced loading in amphibious shipping 8 Feb 68 to sail 10 Feb 68 for amphibious exercise in WESTPAC, and it is assumed it will proceed as planned.

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For further discussion, see TAB A, Strategic Mobility 1
Capab: ity. 2

(4) Current Major Personnel and Equipment Shortages. 3

(a) Personnel. Nonutilization of replacement 4
pipeline personnel would require drawdowns on those 5
units not deployed thereby reducing their readiness 6
for other possible commitments. Shortfalls in remain- 7
ing East Coast units would be about 5,000 personnel 8
and in remaining West Coast units about 3,000 personnel. 9
Except for combat capable pilots, no drawdowns would 10
be required if replacement pipeline personnel were 11
utilized. 12

(b) Equipment. There are no mission essential 13
equipment shortages which cannot be resolved prior 14
to deployment from current assets. Units will deploy 15
with organizational equipment and five days of supplies, 16
including ammunition (units equipped with M-14 rifles). 17
For further discussion, see TAB B, Logistic Considera- 18
tions. 19

c. Priority of Movement. Within the constraints of avail- 20
able airlift priority should be given to moving the entire 21
82d Airborne Division. This priority would avoid piecemeal 22
commitment of both Army and Marine Corps combat elements and 23
recognizes the fact that the 82d Airborne Division may be 24
ready for deployment earlier. 25

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TAB A TO ANNEX B

STRATEGIC MOVEMENT CAPABILITY

1. Purpose: The purpose of this TAB is to determine under
 varying lift options the requirements and capabilities to
 transport military forces and materiel from the United States
 to Southeast Asia.*

2. Assumptions:

 - a. That lift capabilities have been determined on the present MAC lift posture and current lift requirements. (Special airlift mission (SARD) requirements are not considered.) Deviation from either of these factors will change the closing times and require additional analyses to determine appropriate closure times.
 - b. That increased MAC airlift requirements in the CINCPAC area since the Pueblo incident have created a temporary aerial port backlog.
 - c. That the movement of the designated emergency forces will be given priority of airlift over other existing scheduled air movements.
 - d. That unit closure time at destination does not take into consideration possible airfield saturation.

3. Movement Scheduling:

 - a. Using the options of airlift force mixes defined in paragraph 2 of Annex E, the 82d Airborne Division can be closed in SEA as follows:

	OPTIONS						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
<u>Plan One</u>							
Passengers 13,038	15	9	8	7	5	5	4
Bulk Cargo 11,585	34	16	15	12	12	12	12**

* Proposed deployments of Air Force fighter and reconnaissance units are not included at this time.

** Use of Option VII which includes CRAF III does not reduce closure time for cargo because no additional outsize airlift capability is gained.

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b. The 6/9 Marine division/wing team (-1 battalion and its equipment), can be closed in SEA in the number of days shown by Options as follows:

OPTIONS						
I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII

Plan One

Passengers 13,154	40	15	14	13	11	11	4	6
Bulk Cargo 14,658	39	18	17	15	13	13	13*	7

c. The total cumulative closure times for the combined airlift movement are:**

OPTIONS						
I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII

Plan One

Passengers 26,192	59	29	27	21	14	13	6	13
Bulk Cargo 26,243	59	33	30	22	19	19	19	14

4. Discussion: CRAF III entails the declaration of a national transportation emergency, which would tend to have a considerable disruptive effect upon the civilian economy. This is not considered feasible at this time; therefore, Option VII is deleted from further consideration other than to indicate impressive amount of lift that becomes available. The possibility of any degree of drawdown on the current level of Southeast Asia airlift support, when evaluated against the existing dangerous environment prevailing within COMUSMACV's area of responsibility, becomes remote without a thorough, detailed analysis of existing supplies and shortages and consideration of losses incurred by unexpected enemy action. For all practical purposes, without further logistic analyses in depth, this would tend to discount Options V and VI. The difference between voluntary participation at the current

* Use of Option VII which includes CRAF III does not reduce closure time for cargo because no additional outsize airlift capability is gained.

** The total closure times do not equal the sum of the individual closure times due to the computer program and the manner in which the model schedules the available aircraft against the multiple requirements.

Tab A to
Annex B

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level by ANG/AFR and the activation of the remaining units
is approximately 28 million ton miles (current level of effort -
11 million ton miles per month versus 39 million ton miles
when activated). The current level of MAC commercial airlift
buy engages approximately 60 percent of the airframes that
would become available in the event CRAF I was invoked (Sec/
Def declaration). Option III applies the significant addition
of ton mile capability of the activated ANG/AFR to the task
of supporting SEA at the current level. This releases lift
resources which may be applied against the requirements
addressed in this study.

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that Option III
be implemented. However, in the event the recent trend of
special assignment airlift continues and additional supply
and resupply requirements generate, it may be prudent to
activate Option IV.

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Tab A to
Annex B

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TAB B TO ANNEX B

LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS (U)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this Tab is to consider the logistic aspects and factors incident to a deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division and 6/9th of a Marine Corps division/wing team, with subsequent callup of certain Reserve component units. 1
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2. Assumptions 5
- a. Additional funds required for the preparation, deployment, and sustaining support will be provided as required. 6
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- b. Increased authority for accelerated procurement to include delegation of authority to the Services to negotiate noncompetitive, cost reimbursable contracts and to provide necessary facilities and materiel will be provided. 8
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3. Equipment Considerations for Deploying Forces. 12
- a. Army 13
- (1) The 82nd Airborne Division can deploy logistically as a combat effective C-1 unit. To achieve C-1 readiness, however, requires the fill of shortages in the division through withdrawal of equipment from other Active and Reserve component units located in CONUS. The division has the older PRC-6 squad and platoon radios and not the newer PRT-4/PRR-9 models with which the US Army units in Vietnam are equipped. Complete quantities of the newer models could not be made available until April. Significant withdrawal of aircraft from other CONUS STRAF units would be necessary to fill shortages in the 82nd Airborne Division. The following is the aircraft status of the division: 14
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- | | <u>Auth</u> | <u>On-Hand</u> | <u>Shortfall</u> | |
|--------------------|-------------|----------------|------------------|----|
| UH-1B/C | 14 | 1 | 13 | 27 |
| UH-1D/H | 35 | 12 | 23 | 28 |
| OH-13, OH-23, OH-6 | 48 | 0 | 48 | 29 |

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(2) In order to complete the fill of UH-1s, 36 would have 1
to be withdrawn from STRAF which has on hand 103 of 811 UH-1s 2
authorized. The required UH-1s could be transferred from 3
present CONUS locations and be on station at Fort Bragg 4
within seven days after decision. Deployability criteria 5
may have to be waived for some aircraft. 6

(3) There are 45 OH-23G helicopters in CONUS; 16 of these 7
are in the training base. It is estimated that 10 percent 8
of the total OH-23s would meet deployment criteria. All 9
of the OH-23s could be furnished within seven days. 10

b. Marine Corps. There are no mission essential equipment 11
shortages which cannot be resolved prior to deployment from 12
current US Marine Corps assets. Units will deploy with organi- 13
zational equipment and five days of supply, including ammu- 14
nition. Units would be equipped with M-14 rifles. Additional 15
combat support stock will be provided by a one-time surge in 16
the established pipeline to SVN. 17

4. POL. The current petroleum inventory in I Corps is 560,000 18
barrels. This represents a 20-day supply to the present I Corps 19
force. The estimated requirement for the 82nd Airborne Division 20
and 6/9ths of a Marine Corps division/wing team is 150,000 barrels/21
month. The addition of this force to I Corps would reduce the 22
days of supply in I Corps to 17 days. Resupply to the new I 23
Corps force can be sustained by tankers from the Persian Gulf and 24
Japan. In the longer run, an additional 150,000 barrels of 25
petroleum storage should be constructed in I Corps. Estimated 26
cost of construction is \$1,500,000. 27

5. Ammunition 28

a. Air Munitions. CINCPAC expended approximately 90,000 29
tons of air munitions during January, which includes support of 30
800 B-52 sorties. This would be increased by approximately 31
12,000 tons commencing in February, with the increase in SAC 32

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B-52 sorties from 800 to 1,200 sorties per month. Present pro- 1
duction is approximately 101,000 tons per month with a pro- 2
duction base expansion capability to over 127,000 tons per 3
month. Current on-hand CINCPAC Southeast Asia assets exceed 4
stockage objectives which will allow for absorption of additive 5
aircraft without seriously degrading present support capability 6
while adjustments are being made to the production base as may 7
be required. The aircraft augmentation considered by the plan 8
is equivalent to 6 squadrons of tactical aircraft which would 9
increase requirements by approximately 7,200 tons a month. 10
This is capable of being supported by moderate increase of 11
present production. 12

b. Ground Munitions 13

(1) During the 4-month period, September-December 1967, 14
the average tonnage expended in SEA for 40 controlled items 15
(about 90 to 95 percent of bulk monthly requirement) has 16
been 102,000 short tons (10,000 S/T ARVN, 92,000 S/T USARV 17
and III MAF). Monthly production of ground munitions is now 18
reaching approximately 113,000 tons a month. From the total 19
monthly production, approximately 10,000 tons per month are 20
committed to essential worldwide training and a limited 21
amount of MAP sales. This leaves some 103,000 tons for 22
support of Southeast Asia. 23

(2) To support consumption generated by the Plan One 24
deployment of one airborne division and 6/9ths Marine 25
division will require an additional 12,000 S/T per month, 26
an increase of 12-1/2 percent. 27

(3) An increase in requirements of this magnitude cannot 28
be supported across the board from current production. A 29
significant item basic to infantry battalion maneuver is 30
the 105MM HE projectile. Current production of this item 31
is at a maximum level within existing facilities. The 32

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procurement leadtime to acquire new production assets 1
varies by item, generally from 6 to 18 months. 2
(4) The deployments considered in Plan One can be 3
supported under the following conditions: 4
(a) A drawdown on previously protected CONUS stocks 5
will be necessary during procurement leadtime for new 6
production. 7
(b) The gross requirement of 12,000 S/T would 8
initially draw down in-country operating and safety 9
levels until other assets could be made available. (A 10
consequence of reduced stock availability could have an 11
impact on the rate of combat operations.) 12
(c) Certain PACOM reserve stocks have been excluded 13
from the above considerations because of requirements 14
associated with the Korean situation. (In view of the 15
political and military conditions in Korea, recommenda- 16
tions for minimal corrective actions have been forwarded 17
to the Secretary of Defense to seek authorization to 18
reposition ammunition in the CINCPAC area for Korea. 19
If immediate action were authorized to reposition 20
sufficient ammunition to balance the ROK war reserves to 21
the authorized 30-combat day level for the support of 22
18 ROK divisions, it would involve repositioning approxi- 23
mately 33,000 S/T of ammunition. This would constrain 24
any major drawdown on the PACOM reserves to offset the 25
munitions requirements of additional forces being con- 26
sidered for deployment to Southeast Asia.) 27
(d) The drawdown on CONUS reserves and training 28
allocations would continue for the period of time 29
required to fill the pipeline from new production to meet 30
monthly consumption. 31

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(5) In order to support increased consumption requirements, expeditious actions must be taken to adjust production schedules and facilities to provide for these added requirements which under Plan One translate into the following (less facilities cost):

(a) 30-day consumption 12,000 S/T \$18 million.
(Note subparagraph 5b(2) above)

(b) 150-day pipeline 60,000 S/T \$90 million.

6. Construction

a. Deployment of forces in Plan One can be made without constraint if executed on an expeditionary (field) basis utilizing TO&E outfitting.

b. Impact on existing facilities (without expansion) of sustained support of expeditionary deployment will vary in degree, subject to the distribution of the units in the ICTZ. The major constraints will be the port and LOC capacity at Dong Ha (Cua Viet), Hue/Phu Bai (Tam My), and Duc Pho (Xa Huyuh), and to a lesser degree at Chu Lai.

c. Continued deployment of the forces in Plan One would require follow-on augmentation of existing facilities, which would require increased civilian contractor construction or deployment of additional Naval Mobile Construction Battalions or Army Engineer Battalions.

d. The plan can be supported by initial deployment on an expeditionary basis, followed by construction of support facilities according to priority of need.

7. Reserve Forces Callup

a. Materiel availability for equipping and sustaining the combat capability of the increased active force levels appears to be the most significant pacing factor in achieving the desired force posture within a reasonable period of time. Relaxation of present administrative controls to expedite production, such as delegation to the Services to negotiate non-competitive contracts, utilizing cost reimbursable forms of

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contracts, or application of additional monies for overtime,
could alleviate specific shortfalls in some areas. Present
materiel requirements, without considering the increased
materiel consumption that will result from the additional
deployments and the partial callup of the Reserve forces, are
not being met currently for naval combatant and auxiliary ships,
helicopters, tracked combat vehicles, tactical wheeled vehicles,
(area communications) equipment, and heavy engineer equip-
ment.

b. If present administrative controls were relaxed to
expedite production, such as delegation to the Services to
negotiate noncompetitive contracts, utilizing cost reimbursable
forms of contracts, and provision of additional monies for
overtime, the Army estimates the following:

(1) Helicopters. No significant increase in COBRA and
HU 1H production can be expected for 18 months. CHINOOK
and LOH production could be increased in 9-12 months.

(2) Tracked Combat Vehicles. No increase in M60A1 tank
production can be expected for 12-13 months. No increased
production in the M-113 family of vehicles can be expected
for approximately nine months, even with a DX rating on
Detroit Diesel engines.

(3) Tactical Wheeled Vehicles. Production can be
increased, in approximately six months.

(4) Tactical Communications. PRT-4/PRR-9, PRC-25, and
VRC-12 radios, counting substitutes, are currently in
adequate supply and production could be increased in six-
eight months. No increase in production of area communica-
tion systems equipment can be expected for approximately 12
months.

(5) Engineer Equipment. Production of major engineer
end items could be increased in approximately 8-10 months.

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The production of generators could not be increased for 1
approximately 12 months due to engine limitations. 2

c. Assuming that REFORGER will be executed, the stationing 3
of a mobilized force of 90,000 Army troops can be accomplished 4
by making maximum use of active installations and activating 5
inactive installations having a capacity for approximately 6
25,000 troops. It is estimated that approximately \$47 million 7
would be required to open inactive installations and to prepare 8
facilities at active installations. 9

d. Army Reserve component assets were found adequate to meet 10
more than 50 percent of the TOE equipment requirements of a 11
90,000 Reserve force. Fifteen percent of this TOE equipment 12
consists of major items with shortages. Analysis of a sampling 13
of this latter group shows that approximately 75 percent of 14
these item shortages can be filled during this fiscal year. 15
The drawdown on Reserve component assets to equip this force 16
will result in reduced training capability and readiness for 17
the units not mobilized. 18

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ANNEX C

PLAN TWO

Maximum Marine Corps Deployments to Vietnam	1			
12/9 Marine Corps Divisions	2			
(1) <u>Deployment concept.</u> Elements of two CONUS	3			
Marine divisions, the 2nd and 5th Divisions, consisting	4			
of 12 battalions could be air transported to Vietnam.	5			
In order to deploy this number of battalions, two weeks	6			
preparation would be required. This deployment would	7			
deplete Marine Corps assets except for three battalions	8			
-- one afloat in the Mediterranean, one afloat in the	9			
Carribean, and one ashore at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The	10			
Hawaii battalion has already deployed by amphibious shipping;	11			
two CONUS battalions will be available for deployment com-	12			
mencing 24 hours after notification, three more battalions	13			
will be available for deployment in one week, and the remain-	14			
ing six battalions by the end of the second week.	15			
(2) Transportation requirements for these forces will	16			
be:	17			
	18			
	No. Units	Personnel	Short Tons	
		(Per Unit)	(Per Unit)	
Hawaii				
Bn (Reinf)	1*	1575	1494	19
West Coast				20
Bn (Reinf)	5	2091	1495	21
Regt Hq	2	222	66	22
Div Hq	1	1424	216	23
East Coast				24
Bn (Reinf)	6	2050	1495	25
Regt Hq	2	222	66	26
Div Hq	1	1475	193	27
Total (All Units)	12 Bns	28117	18617	28

* One BLT based in Hawaii commenced loading in amphibious shipping 8 Feb 68 to sail 10 Feb for amphibious exercise in WESTPAC, and it is assumed it will proceed as planned.

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For movement options, see Tab A, Strategic Mobility	1
Capability.	2
(3) <u>Deployment Criteria</u> . This plan would be based	3
upon:	4
(a) No Reserve call-up or legislative action.	5
(b) Personnel returned from Vietnam are deploy-	6
able irrespective of return date.	7
(c) Personnel with less than 30 days to expira-	8
tion of active service, or a date of deployment, are	9
not deployable.	10
(d) Vietnam replacement draft (pipeline) is used	11
as fillers.	12
(4) <u>Current Personnel and Equipment Status</u> .	13
(a) <u>Personnel</u> . No drawdowns would be required	14
since replacement pipeline personnel are utilized.	15
(b) <u>Equipment</u> . There are no mission essential	16
equipment shortages which cannot be resolved prior	17
to deployment from current assets. Units will deploy	18
with organizational equipment and five days of sup-	19
plies including ammunition (units equipped with M-14	20
rifles). Increased obligational authority is required	21
to reconstitute that portion of the combat stocks	22
of the other uncommitted forces, including IV MEF,	23
drawdown to support the deploying 5th Division units,	24
for which combat stocks were not previously authorized.	25
For further discussion, see Tab B, Logistic Considera-	26
tions.	27

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221103-618

TAB A TO ANNEX C

STRATEGIC MOVEMENT CAPABILITY

1. Purpose: The purpose of this TAB is to determine under varying lift options the requirements and capabilities to transport military forces and materiel from the United States to Southeast Asia.* 1
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2. Assumptions: 5
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- a. That lift capabilities have been determined on the present MAC lift posture and current lift requirements. (Special airlift mission (SARD) requirements are not considered.) Deviation from either of these factors will change the closing times and require additional analyses to determine appropriate closure times. 12
13
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 - b. That increased MAC airlift requirements in the CINCPAC area since the Pueblo incident have created a temporary aerial port backlog. 15
16
17
 - c. That the movement of the designated emergency forces will be given priority of airlift over other existing scheduled air movements. 18
19
 - d. That unit closure time at destination does not take into consideration possible airfield saturation. 20
21
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23
3. Movement Scheduling: Using the options of airlift force mixes defined in paragraph 2 of Annex E, the 11 separate Marine battalions can be closed in SEA in the number of days shown by Options as follows: 24
25
26

	OPTIONS						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
<u>Plan Two</u>							
Passengers 26,542	30	17	14	12	12	9	7 27
Bulk Cargo 17,123	31	22	21	15	12	12	11** 28

* Proposed deployments of Air Force fighter and reconnaissance units are not included at this time.

** Use of Option VII which includes CRAF III does not reduce closure time for cargo because no additional outsize airlift capability is gained.

41103-619

4. Discussion: CRAF III entails the declaration of a national transportation emergency, which would tend to have a considerable disruptive effect upon the civilian economy. This is not considered feasible at this time; therefore, Option VII is deleted from further consideration other than to indicate impressive amount of lift that becomes available. The possibility of any degree of drawdown on the current level of Southeast Asia airlift support, when evaluated against the existing dangerous environment prevailing within COMUSMACV's area of responsibility, becomes remote without a thorough, detailed analysis of existing supplies and shortages and consideration of losses incurred by unexpected enemy action. For all practical purposes, without further logistic analyses in depth, this would tend to discount Option V and VI. The difference between voluntary participation at the current level by ANG/AFR and the activation of the remaining units is approximately 28 million ton miles (current level of effort - 11 million ton miles per month versus 39 million ton miles when activated). The current level of MAC commercial airlift buy engages approximately 60 percent of the airframes that would become available in the event CRAF I was invoked (Sec/Def declaration). Option III applies the significant addition of ton mile capability of the activated ANG/AFR to the task of supporting SEA at the current level. This releases lift resources which may be applied against the requirements addressed in this study.

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that Option II be implemented as the best of the two courses of action that do not activate the remainder of the ANG and AFR airlift forces. If activation of the ANG and AFR airlift forces is permitted, the best course of action is Option III. However, in the event the recent trend of special assignment airlift continues and additional supply and resupply requirements generate, it may be prudent to activate Option IV.

Tab A to
Annex C

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TAB B TO ANNEX C

LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS (U)

1. <u>Purpose.</u> The purpose of this Tab is to consider the logistic aspects and factors incident to a deployment of a 12/9ths Marine Corps division.	1 2 3
2. <u>Assumptions</u>	4
a. Additional funds required for the preparation, deployment and sustaining support will be provided as required.	5 6
b. Increased authority for accelerated procurement to include delegation of authority to the Services to negotiate noncompetitive, cost-reimbursable contracts and to provide necessary facilities and materiel will not be provided.	7 8 9 10
3. <u>Equipment Considerations for Deploying Forces.</u> There is no combat essential equipment shortage within the units listed as deployable which cannot be resolved prior to deployment from current assets. Units will deploy with organizational equipment and five days of combat support stock including ammunition (units armed with M-14 rifles). Additional combat support stock will be provided by a one-time surge in the established pipeline to Southeast Asia.	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
4. <u>POL</u>	19
a. The current petroleum inventory in I Corps is 560,000 barrels. This represents a 20-day supply to the present I Corps force. The estimated requirement for the Marine Corps battalions is 140,000 BBLS/month. The addition of this force to I Corps would reduce the days of supply in I Corps to 18 days.	20 21 22 23 24 25
b. Resupply to the new I Corps force can be sustained by tankers from the Persian Gulf and Japan.	26 27

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- c. In the longer run, an additional 140,000 barrels of 1
petroleum storage should be constructed in I Corps. 2
Estimated cost of construction is \$1,140,000. 3
5. Ammunition 4
- a. Air Munitions. No tactical aircraft will be involved; 5
in this plan. 6
- b. Ground Munitions 7
- (1) During the 4-month period, September-December 8
1967, the average tonnage expended in Southeast Asia for 9
40 controlled items (about 90 to 95 percent of bulk 10
monthly requirement) has been 102,000 short tons (10,000 11
S/T ARVN, 92,000 S/T USARV and III MAF). Monthly pro- 12
duction of ground munitions is now reaching approximately 13
113,000 tons a month. From the total monthly production, 14
approximately 10,000 tons per month are committed to 15
essential worldwide training and a limited amount of MAP 16
sales. This leaves some 103,000 tons for support of 17
Southeast Asia. 18
- (2) To support consumption generated by the Plan Two 19
deployment of CONUS based Marine elements (estimate 4 Bde 20
equivalents) will require an additional 9,600 S/T per 21
month, an increase of 10 percent. 22
- (3) An increase in requirements of this magnitude 23
cannot be supported across the board from current pro- 24
duction. A significant item basic to infantry battalion 25
maneuver is the 105MM HE projectile. Current production 26
of this item is at a maximum level within existing 27
facilities. The procurement leadtime to acquire new 28
production assets varies by item, generally from 6 to 29
18 months. 30
- (4) The deployments considered in Plan Two would be 31
supported under the following conditions: 32

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- (a) A drawdown on previously protected CONUS stocks will be necessary during procurement leadtime for new production. 1
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- (b) The gross requirement of 9,600 S/T would initially draw down in-country operating and safety levels until other assets could be made available. (A consequence of reduced stock availability could have an impact on the rate of combat operations) 4
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- (c) Certain PACOM reserve stocks have been excluded from the above considerations because of requirements associated with the Korean situation. (In view of the political and military conditions in Korea, recommendations for minimal corrective actions have been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense to seek authorization to reposition ammunition in the CINCPAC area for Korea. If immediate action were authorized to reposition sufficient ammunition to balance the ROK war reserves to the authorized 30-combat day level for the support of 18 ROK divisions, it would involve repositioning approximately 33,000 S/T of ammunition. This would constrain any major drawdown of the PACOM reserves to offset the munitions requirements of additional forces being considered for deployment to Southeast Asia). 9
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- (d) The drawdown on CONUS reserves and training allocations would continue for the period of time required to fill the pipeline from new production to meet monthly consumption. 25
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- (5) In order to support increased consumption requirement, expeditious action must be taken to adjust 29
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production schedules and facilities to provide for these
added requirements which under Plan Two translate into
the following (less facilities cost):
(a) 30-day consumption 9,600 S/T \$14.1 million
(Note subparagraph 5b(2))
(b) 150-day pipeline 48,000 S/T \$72 million

6. Construction

a. The deployments in Plan Two (26,000 men) can be made
without constraint if executed on an expeditionary (field)
basis utilizing TO&E outfitting.

b. Impact on existing facilities (without expansion) of
sustained support of expeditionary deployment will vary in
degree, subject to the distribution of the units in the
ICTZ. The major constraints will be the port and LOC capa-
city at Dong Ha (Cua Viet), Hue/Phu Bai (Tam My), and
Duc Pho (Xa Huyuh), and to a lesser degree at Chu Lai.

c. Continued deployment of the forces in Plan Two would
require follow-on augmentation of existing facilities, which
would require increased civilian contractor construction or
deployment of additional Naval Mobile Construction Battalions
or Army Engineer Battalions.

d. The plan can be supported by initial deployment on an
expeditionary basis, followed by construction of support
facilities according to priority of need.

7. Other Factors. Plan Two creates lesser requirements for
logistic support than Plan One. Nevertheless, execution of Plan
Two would further aggravate the shortage of long procurement lead
time items which are currently short such as helicopters, tracked
combat vehicles, engineer equipment and ammunition. Unlike Plan
One however, the accelerated replacement of materiel drawn down
from other units and stocks would not be possible because of the
lack of legislative authorization that is inherent in Plan One.

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Tab B to
Annex C

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ANNEX D

PLAN THREE

Deployment of the 82d Airborne Division to South Vietnam.	1
	2
a. <u>82d Airborne Division</u>	3
(1) <u>Deployment concept.</u> Without prior notice, elements of one brigade can commence movement in 24 hours; the division itself 36-48 hours later. Deploy- ment would be conducted in four echelons: two brigade task forces followed by the division support element, then a brigade task force. The deployments can be continuous if aircraft are available.	4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(2) Major forces to be deployed from CONUS within one week:	11 12
82d Airborne Division Headquarters	13
Division Support Command	14
Three Airborne Brigades	15
Three Airborne Battalions each	16
Division Artillery	17
Three Field Artillery Battalions (105 mm)	18
One Cavalry Squadron	19
Total Authorized Strength	13,038
(3) <u>Transportation Requirements.</u> The transportation requirements for the move of the 82d Airborne Division from Fort Bragg (and staging areas) are as follows:	21 22 23
Personnel (Authorized strength)	13,038
Short tons of cargo	11,585

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For movement options, see Tab A, Strategic Movement Capability.	1
	2
(4) Deployment Criteria and Current Major Shortages:	3
(a) <u>Personnel</u> . Division is currently short 3,074 personnel but can be filled with non-airborne personnel in 7-10 days using 30 days expiration of term of service (ETS) retainability criteria.	4
(b) <u>Aviators</u> . Division currently has shortage of 133 officer/warrant officer aviators, but these can be provided within 7-10 days after decision by using 30-days ETS retainability criteria. Replacing aviator shortages will cause severe personal hardship and curtail the provision of aviators to Korea.	5
(c) <u>Aircraft</u> . Current status:	6
Auth On-Hand Shortfall	7
UH-1B/C 14 1 13*	8
UH-1D/H 35 12 23*	9
OH-13, OH-23, OH-6	10
48 0 48**	11
For further discussion, see Tab B, Logistic Considerations.	12
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* 36 aircraft to be provided from STRAF within 7 days which has 103 of 811 UH-1s authorized. Deployability criteria may have to be waived for some aircraft.

** All OH-23s can be furnished in seven days from CONUS assets if deployability criteria is waived.

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TAB A TO ANNEX D

STRATEGIC MOVEMENT CAPABILITY

1. Purpose: The purpose of this TAB is to determine under varying lift options the requirements and capabilities to transport military forces and materiel from the United States to Southeast Asia.* 1
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2. Assumptions: 6
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- a. That lift capabilities have been determined on the present MAC lift posture and current lift requirements. (Special airlift mission (SARD) requirements are not considered.) Deviation from either of these factors will change the closing times and require additional analyses to determine appropriate closure times.
- b. That increased MAC airlift requirements in the CINCPAC area since the Pueblo incident have created a temporary aerial port backlog.
- c. That the movement of the designated emergency forces will be given priority of airlift over other existing scheduled air movements.
- d. That unit closure time at destination does not take into consideration possible airfield saturation.
3. Movement Scheduling: Using the options of airlift force mixes defined in paragraph 2 of Annex E, the 82d Airborne Division can be closed in SEA in the number of days shown by Options as follows:

	OPTIONS							24 25 26 27 28
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
<u>Plan Three</u>								
Passengers 13,038	15	9	8	7	5	5	4	
Bulk Cargo 11,585	34	16	15	12	12	12	12**	

* Proposed deployments of Air Force fighter and reconnaissance units are not included at this time.

** Use of Option VII which includes CRAF III does not reduce closure time for cargo because no additional outsize airlift capability is gained.

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4. Discussion: CRAF III entails the declaration of a
national transportation emergency, which would tend to have
a considerable disruptive effect upon the civilian economy.
This is not considered feasible at this time; therefore,
Option VII is deleted from further consideration other than
to indicate impressive amount of lift that becomes available.
The possibility of any degree of drawdown on the current level
of Southeast Asia airlift support, when evaluated against
the existing dangerous environment prevailing within COMUSMACV's
area of responsibility, becomes remote without a thorough,
detailed analysis of existing supplies and shortages and con-
sideration of losses incurred by unexpected enemy action.
For all practical purposes, without further logistic analyses
in depth, this would tend to discount Option V and VI. The
difference between voluntary participation at the current
level by ANG/AFR and the activation of the remaining units
is approximately 28 million ton miles (current level of effort -
11 million ton miles per month versus 39 million ton miles
when activated). The current level of MAC commercial airlift
buy engages approximately 60 percent of the airframes that
would become available in the event CRAF I was invoked (Sec/Def
declaration). Option II applies the significant addition of
ton mile capability of the activated ANG/AFR to the task
of supporting SEA at the current level. This releases lift
resources which may be applied against the requirements addressed
in this study.

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that Option II be
implemented as the best of the two courses of action that do
not activate the remainder of the ANG and AFR airlift forces.
If activation of the ANG and AFR airlift forces is permitted.
the best course of action is Option III. However, in the event
the recent trend of special assignment airlift continues and
additional supply and resupply requirements generate, it may
be prudent to activate Option IV.

Tab A to
Annex D

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TAB B TO ANNEX D

LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. <u>Purpose.</u> The purpose of this Tab is to consider the logistic aspects and factors incident to a deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division.	1 2 3	
2. <u>Assumptions</u>	4	
a. Additional funds required for the preparation, deployment, and sustaining support will be provided as required.	5 6	
b. Increased authority for accelerated procurement to include delegation of authority to the Services to negotiate noncompetitive, cost-reimbursable contracts and to provide necessary facilities and materiel will not be provided.	7 8 9 10	
3. <u>Equipment Considerations for Deploying Force</u>	11	
a. The 82nd Airborne Division can deploy logistically as a combat effective C-1 unit. To achieve C-1 readiness, however, requires the fill of shortages in the division through withdrawal of equipment from other Active and Reserve component units located in CONUS. The division has the older PRC-6 squad and platoon radios and not the newer PRT-4/PRR-9 models with which the US Army units in Vietnam are equipped. Complete quantities of the newer models could not be made available until April. Significant withdrawal of aircraft from other CONUS STRAF units would be necessary to fill shortages in the 82nd Airborne Division. The following is the aircraft status of the division:	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	
Auth On-Hand Shortfall	24	
UH-1B/C	14 1 13	25
UH-1D/H	35 12 23	26
OH-13, OH-23, OH-6	48 0 48	27

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- b. In order to complete the fill of UH-1s, 36 would have 1
to be withdrawn from STRAF which has on hand 103 of 811 2
UH-1s authorized. The required UH-1s could be transferred 3
from present CONUS locations and be on station at Fort Bragg 4
within seven days after decision. Deployability criteria 5
may have to be waived for some aircraft. 6
- c. There are 45 OH-23G helicopters in CONUS; 16 of these 7
are in the training base. It is estimated that 10 percent of 8
the total OH-23s would meet deployment criteria. All of the 9
OH-23s could be furnished within seven days. 10
4. POL 11
- a. The current petroleum inventory in I Corps is 560,000 12
barrels. This represents a 20-day supply to the present 13
I Corps force. The estimated requirement for the 82nd 14
Airborne Division is 70,000 BBLS/month. The addition of 15
this force to I Corps would reduce the days of supply in 16
I Corps to 19 days. 17
- b. Resupply to the new I Corps force can be sustained by 18
tankers from the Persian Gulf and Japan. 19
- c. In the longer run, an additional 70,000 barrels of 20
petroleum storage should be constructed in I Corps. 21
Estimated cost of construction is \$700,000. 22
5. Ammunition 23
- a. Air Munitions. With the normal quantity of gun ships 24
authorized, the requirement for rockets should present no 25
air munitions requirement problems. 26
- b. Ground Munitions 27
- (1) During the 4-month period, September-December 28
1967, the average tonnage expended in Southeast Asia for 29
40 controlled items (about 90 to 95 percent of bulk 30
monthly requirement) has been 102,000 short tons (10,000 31
S/T ARVN, 92,00 S/T USARV and III MAF). Monthly pro- 32
duction of ground munitions is now reaching approximately 33

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113,000 tons a month. From the total monthly production, 1
approximately 10,000 tons per month are committed to 2
essential worldwide training and a limited amount of MAP 3
sales. This leaves some 103,000 tons for support of 4
Southeast Asia. 5

(2) To support consumption generated by the Plan Three, 6
deployment of one airborne division will require an 7
additional 7,200 S/T per month, an increase of 8 percent. 8

(3) An increase in requirements of this magnitude 9
cannot be supported across the board from current pro- 10
duction. A significant item basic to infantry battalion 11
maneuver is the 105MM HE projectile. Current production 12
of this item is at a maximum level within existing 13
facilities. The procurement leadtime to acquire new 14
production assets varies by item, generally from 6 to 15
18 months. 16

(4) The deployments considered in Plan Three can be 17
supported under the following conditions: 18

(a) A drawdown on previously protected CONUS stocks 19
will be necessary during procurement leadtime for new 20
production. 21

(b) The gross requirement of 7,200 S/T would 22
initially draw down in-country operating and safety 23
levels until other assets could be made available. 24
(A consequence of reduced stock availability could 25
have an impact on the rate of combat operations). 26

(c) Certain PACOM reserve stocks have been 27
excluded from the above considerations because of 28
requirements associated with the Korean situation. 29

(In view of the political and military conditions in 30
Korea, recommendations for minimal corrective actions 31

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have been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense to seek 1
authorization to reposition ammunition in the CINCPAC 2
area for Korea. If immediate action were authorized to 3
reposition sufficient ammunition to balance the ROK war 4
reserves to the authorized 30-combat day level for the 5
support of 18 ROK divisions, it would involve reposi- 6
tioning approximately 33,000 S/T of ammunition. This 7
would constrain any major drawdown on the PACOM reserve 8
to offset the munitions requirements of additional 9
forces being considered for deployment to Southeast 10
Asia). 11

(d) The drawdown on CONUS reserves and training 12
allocations would continue for the period of time 13
required to fill the pipeline from new production to 14
meet monthly consumption. 15

(5) In order to support increased consumption require- 16
ments expeditious action must be taken to adjust pro- 17
duction schedules and facilities to provide for these 18
added requirements which under Plan Three translate into 19
the following (less facilities cost). 20

(a) 30-day consumption 7,200 S/T \$10.8 million 21

(Note subparagraph 5b(2)above) 22

(b) 150-day pipeline 36,000 S/T 54 million 23

6. Construction 24

a. The deployments in Plan Three (13,000 men) can be made 25
without constraint if executed on an expeditionary (field) 26
basis utilizing TO&E outfitting. 27

b. Impact on existing facilities (without expansion) of 28
sustained support of expeditionary deployment will vary in 29
degree, subject to the distribution of the units in the ICTZ. 30
The major constraints will be the port and LOC capacity at 31
Dong Ha (Cua Viet), Hue/Phu Bai (Tam My), and Duc Pho (Xa 32
Huyuh), and to a lesser degree at Chu Lai. 33

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- c. Continued deployment of the forces in Plan Three would 1
require follow-on augmentation of existing facilities, which 2
would require increased civilian contractor construction or 3
deployment of additional Naval Mobile Construction Battalions 4
or Army Engineer Battalions. 5
- d. The plan can be supported by initial deployment on 6
an expeditionary basis, followed by construction of support 7
facilities according to priority of need. 8
7. Other Factors. Plan Three creates lesser requirements for 9
logistic support than Plan One. Nevertheless, execution of Plan 10
Three would further aggravate the shortage of long procurement 11
lead time items which are currently short such as helicopters, 12
tracked combat vehicles, engineer equipment and ammunition. 13
Unlike Plan One however, the accelerated replacement of materiel 14
drawn down from other units and stocks would not be possible 15
because of lack of legislative authorization that is inherent in 16
Plan One. 17

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